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ABSTRACT : "Chemical runaways" consdtute major sources of accidents in chemical processes. In this
communication, we underline the lessons we learned from the implementation of the System on an
industrial site. Firstly, introduction of the system may be defined äs a know-how and technique transfer.
Secondly, the interest of the approach of introducing the technical system is not limited to use of the
system and its characteristics, but should be extended to all the action conditions. On this basis, we argue
that the industrialization of an artefact like the one we have designed should be done with each
installation.
KEYWORDS : Chemical runaway, technique transfer, innovation, design and risk, latent errors.
INTRODUCTION
In this communication, we would like to contribute some elements from inderdisciplinary research whose
purpose was to develop an aid system designed to prevent "chemical runaways" taking place along with
their consequences at human level (death), environmental level (SEVESO type companies) and industrial
level (destruction of installations).
This project follows an inquiry we made into a chemical runaway in a nuclear plant in 1994. The
accident was fatal for one operator. In this case, two hours before the explosion, the operators realised
that something was wrong. The five operators tried to get out of the unit a few seconds before the
explosion. This type of result (which was largely confirmed by other analyses) shows that process
operators often think that the time they have before an explosion is more than it really is. Our aim was
the design of a system that would warn operators of the arrival of a chemical runaway and would predict
the time remaining until an imminent explosion.
AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
Design is a complex process and, in our case, it appeared necessary to dissociate two phases: (i) a first
one, which comes under innovation, meaning the design of the principle, (u) and a second phase which
comes under industrialisation of the principle, meaning the implementation of the innovation in a given
Situation. The two stages have their own research objectives even though, in this communication, our
objective is to deal with the industrialization phase.
An innovative system: The Chemical Runaway Detector/Forecaster (DPE).
The innovation consists of specifying an artefact of which a large number of examples will be used in
multiple situations in life or at work. Therefore the challenge consists of dealing with the general case.
In our case, INERIS engineers developed a method for predicting the critical moment of chemical
runaway. The method was implemented in a Version called "DPE" -Runaway Detector/Forecaster - and
tested in an experimental Situation ("large scale" experiment) in order to assess its accuracy.
' : This study was financed with the help of ANVAR and INERIS. We would like to thank Mrs. G.
Beaumont (IPSN) for her assistance äs well äs the BBGR Chimie Company in Sezanne
3rd International Workshop of Human Error, Safety and System Development,
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Marss & Coll, 1989) analyzed the typology of around 200 accidents which took place in chemical
reactors operating non-stop. The DPE is a system which detects around 60% of the accidents described
in the Marss & Coll database. Sudden reactions (reactive loading en-or) or explosive reactions which take
place in a few minutes (except for specific adaptation) are excluded from its scope. Naturally, the
reliability of the information given increases if we have studies of the chemical kinetics of the expected
reactions However, the kinetics of chemical runaways might not have been studied either due to the lack
of a preliminary study or because of a minor change in the quality of a basic product. The most
interesting aspect of the system is that, despite the lack of specific studies, it can assess the Time to
Maximum Rate (TMR) with a moderate error level.
2.2 - From technical innovation to technology transfer
We have just seen that the innovation deals with the general. Industrialization is a much different phase
which deals with the singularity of a given Situation. It could be described äs the phase of "discovery of a
Company ".
A considerable amount of research has shown the existence of contradictory organization and/or
technical logics (De Terssac, G. 1992; Leplat, J. 1997). These logics can be converted into forms of latent
error (Reason, J. 1990), meaning the presence ofelements which can remain dormant for a long time and
whose dangerous character most often only appears at the time of an accident (Reason, J., op.cit.). In this
context, the control of technical Systems should not only be considered äs a negative factor but äs a factor
of reliability (Amalberti, R. 1996). Concretely, we wanted to know how and under what conditions the
DPE would fit into the socio-technical system, including the cognitive functioning of operators and the
use of Systems placed at their disposal.
At the same time, examining the implementation of the artefact in existing structures is not fully
satisfactory. The DPE is a technical system whose purpose is to make the socio-technical system reliable.
Therefore, we also wanted to know if evolutionary dynamics existed following the introduction of the
DPE and, if so, their conditions and limits.
And yet the industrialization of an innovation is a stage that is not very conceptualized. In ergonomics,
the technology transfer has practically only been studied in the specific context of the modernization of
an industrially developing country (Wisner, A. 1997). But for intra-national transfers, most of the work
(done in France) concerned the socio-economic field. The main lesson learned from this research is that
industrialization should be done systematically since the innovation cannot be defined simply in terms of
technical bases. On the contrary, it is the environment of the installation which will determine if the
technical system has an innovative character or not.
CHARACTER1STICS OF THE PILOT SITE AND METHODOLOGY
The DPE was introduced in a small catalyst production unit which produced synthetic optical lenses. The
process of the pilot site (where industrialization took place) consisted of synthesizing a few dozen kilos
of product from glass reactors. The operators were located beside the reactors which were installed in the
"control room". The synthesis of the catalyst was exothermic: the temperature of the product could rise
by itself. From the outset, the catalyst also started to self-destruct in an exothermic way by releasing
secondary gaseous and explosive products (this is the "chemical runaway"). To prevent any chemical
runaway, the catalyst is cooled during the synthesis by circulating glycolated water in coils placed in the
reactors. In addition, its thermal and chemical homogeneity is ensured by agitators. Symmetrically, an
excessive cooling can lead to cystallization of the product, preceded by an unstable "super-undercooling"
phase. Between the solid state of erystallization and the gaseous state of chemical runaway, the product is
liquid.
The industrialization of the DPE took place in two phases. An initial phase called "exploratory study"
enabled us to characterize the socio-technical system of the pilot site. It lasted four months. During this
stage, we used the Ergonomie Work Analysis (Wisner, A. 1995; De Keyser, V. 1991 ) which French-
speaking ergonomists have developed over the last 30 years on the basis of the initial work of
(Ombredane & Faverge, 1955). For reasons of objectivity, this involves the exhaustive recording of the
behaviour of operators and the Status of technical Systems during execution of the action; on the basis of
these observations, the operators are interviewed in order to obtain pertinent explanations, to validate the
interpretations obtained from the observation and to generalize the results.
The purpose of the second phase, called "experimentell", was to characterize the evolutionary dynamics,
It lasted eight months. When it was introduced on the pilot site, the DPE had a digital temperature
display, a TMR display for each of the reactors and visual and sound alarms which were activated for a
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given value of the TMR. Two types of methodology were used : Ergonomie Work Analysis and task
Simulation techniques. Concretely, the intention was tq manipulate certain determinants of the action on
the site and to analyze the activity of the operätörs in ttie" Situation created äs such. In this case,
Simulation of the task was considered äs a cognitive finality method (Simon, H. 1981) but also äs an
approach which could create situations of exchange among players with heterogenec'us knowledge:
designers, Supervisors, operators and ergonomists (Beguin., P., & Weill Passina, A. 1997^.
CONTROLLING THE PROCESS WITH THE DPE
The "experimental phase" of introduction of the DPE highiighted paradoxical results. First of all, the
operators consulted the artefact more and more often which, a priori, was positive. But an analysis
showed that it was the temperature information provided by the DPE which was significant for the
operators and not the TMR which actually constituted the interest of the system. The more the operators
consulted the interface, the less they consulted the temperature indications which were provided
previously (Cf. table l). At the same time, fluctuations appeared in the TMR. This alerted the operators,
indicating the existence of a danger they were obviously not aware of. But since they had no possibility
of interpretation, this alarm made them perplex. This was considered äs worrying by the operators but did
not appear in the process control. How can this result be interpreted? An analysis of the socio-technical
system provided some answers.
period during
which information
was read on the
DPE
period during
which information
was read on the
analogue
temperature
indicators
Istweek
1.7%
27.3%
2nd month
8.1%
24.5%
4th month
31.5%
4.2%
Table l: Comparative development, during the experimental phase, of
the period during which information was read on the DPE and the
thermometers available previously (in % of the total control time). The
DPE temperature was consulted more and more to the detriment of
analogue indicators which are less accurate.
Control strategies and daily risks
The operators develop control strategies on the basis of the lower temperature threshold (super
undercooling) and not on the basis of the upper threshold which corresponds to the TMR. This control
strategy, very dose to crystallization has several origins:
- First of all, the system should be kept at dose äs possible to the lower temperature threshold since
experience shows that the colder the product during synthesis, the more the catalyst obtained will be of
good quality from the physico-chemical viewpoint: the catalyst Starts to self-destruct from the outset.
- Secondly, the characteristics of the technical system, in particular the system for cooling the product
during synthesis, tend to spontaneously lead to super undercooling. In such a context; the operators are
more inclined to let the temperature of the product rise than to take action to cool it.
Yet, process control very dose to the low temperature threshold is a difficult exercise during which the
skills of the operators develop. In this way, real crystallization theories were highiighted by an analysis
of the activity. These are theories for the action, constructed during the work, whose purpose is to serve
the action . The paradoxical result of the Status which the operators give to the DPE information can thus
be better understood:
- First of all, it is the temperature information that is used since it is part of the cognitive constructions
and the uses already constructed by the operators. At the same time, the TMR appears external since
what is important is not the TMR but what the TMR indicates. Yet, äs we have just seen, in Situation
the operators develop knowledge which is far removed from the major risk constituted by chemical
runaway. Therefore, it could be thought that they do not have all the cognitive instruments necessary to
judge this information.
- Symmetrically, it is certain that control very dose to super undercooling is less risky than a chemical
runaway. But nevertheless it is considered by operators and their Supervisors äs a serious incident
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which should be avoided since, in one way or another, the product must be left to warm with all the
risks linked to the instability of the polymer provoked by warming of the product. It could even be
thought that, in this Situation, chemical runaway could appear following super undercooling that was
badly controlled.
Technical transfer and know-how transfer
These two aspects could be summarized by considering the introduction of the innovation äs a technical
and know-how transfer. The transfer was from the engineers to operators: the appearance of
developments of the TMR required explanations concerning their significance. This was due to particular
physico-chemical phenomena (micro chemical runaway) which appear in the reactor but do not require
the implementation of emergency procedures. As such, training sessions were organized. The transfer
also went from the operators (who develop singular knowledge which comes under "expertise" of
crystallization) to the engineers: control very dose to crystallization constitutes a good compromise. But
it is not free of danger and there is a need for aid. In our Situation, this vision led us to complement the
principles of display of the temperature values provided to the operators. Initially, the temperature
information was only given in a digital form. We kept this type of display since its accuracy corresponds
to the requirements of the operators. But we added an analogue display with memory storage of the
temperature curve. This facilitates the interpretation of the TMR (identification of "micro chemical
runaways") and helps with control "very dose tu super undercooling".
PACING UP TO AND MANAGING THE UNKNOWN
Process control very dose to super undercooling constitutes a class of Situation that is well known to
operators. But, äs we underlined previously, a runaway could appear following a badly controlled super
undercooling. Operators could then find themselves in another class of Situation, the chemical runaway,
which they know little about. Knowledge of the runaway in itself does not constitute the only element of
doubt. The actions to be taken to deal with it are also relatively uncertain, both äs regards the operators
and the supervisory staff (security manager, foreman, methods manager, etc.) on the site. Here again, this
is due to the lack of experience available.
One of these actions consists of "destroying the product", meaning that the reaction is inhibited by a
chemical process and is evacuated using specific techniques and means Nevertheless, destruction of the
product and the technical and organization conditions under which it is done, are problematic and
uncertain since they are not really tried and tested. It should be noted that in the present Situation, which
has lasted for the 20 years that the site has been open, three "destructions" have taken place. In two cases,
this followed technical problems (damage to equipment). In the third case, the problem was due to the
production quality.
The DPE: a Simulation tool
Since it provides information about the thermal kinetics of the product in the case of a chemical runaway,
the DPE constitutes an opportunity to do a real test on the temporal conditions of the action consecutive
to a chemical runaway. In this sense, we can use it like a Simulation tool in order to explore the temporal
conditions of a chemical runaway.
In the approach we used, Simulation was done on the production in order to maintain all the physical and
material characteristics. The main objeetive difference was the fact that the product contained in the
reactors consisted of a chemically inert liquid. But the thermal kinetics of a chemical runaway were
provided by the DPE. Computerized, recorded data of a chemical runaway in a laboratory were sent to
the DPE which caiculated the TMR on this basis. All the players liable to be present at the time of a
chemical runaway were associated. The control operators, naturally, but also the foremen and the
technical managers, who are usually not on the site, were also present.
An examination of the technical and organizationai conditions
The most interesting part of this Simulation approach concerned the production and implementation of
the scenarios. In our study, several scenarios were produced but in all cases the approach used was the
same: (i) initially a meeting was planned at which the scenarios were defmed collectively, (ii) the
scenarios were then implemented in Situation by the operators and analyzed by the ergonomists and (iii)
the approach ended with a debriefing. Each of these stages had a specific interest.
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The interest of the meetings was that they led to the procedures being examined. This examination
revealed certain ambiguities. For example, while the quality,procedures indicated certain temperature
values, the security procedures indicated other values everi though the action to be done was the same.
Yet the procedure which could be defined äs an operative procedure or method, designed to respond to a
clearly defined Situation, constitutes an element whose existence is all the more important when the
Situation is rare and when action had to be taken in conditions of great time constraints with considerable
consequences för production. All the conditions were present here.
The second stage, that of implementation of the action, had two interests. First of all, it was an
opportunity for the operators to test, in action, an event that was too rare to be part of the local
experiment. Secondly, it enabled the socio-technical system to be requestioned on the basis of execution
of the action in an class of Situation that was not well known. Let's take two examples. For one of the
scenarios, it was considered, a priori, that three operators were necessary to perform the action. The
Simulation showed that, on the contrary, six persons were required. This figure corresponds to the
number of persons who should be allocated to the site and be permanently present, which was not the
case. This last point deserves to be theorized. The testing of the action, under chemical runaway
conditions that are not well known, would reveal latent errors that were present on the site but not
identified for a class of Situation which was made rare by the activity of the operators.
Finally, the debriefing also had two interests. First of all, it was an opportunity to transfer the knowledge
of the engineers (present on the site) to the operators. Since it is a source of surprise, testing of the
runaway conditions in action generates beneficial debates and exchanges. Secondly, the treatment of
latent errors was facilitated by the presence of the supervisory staff on the site. It should be noted that
each Simulation ended with action decisions which concerned either the procedures, the technical
conditions or, finally, the organizational conditions.
DISCUSSION
The industrialization of an innovation constitutes a stage is that little conceptualized. First of all, it could
be considered äs an adjustment of the artefact on the basis of a confrontation with reality. Nevertheless,
our results show that this should be renewed for each installation of the DPE. One of the Strategie aspects
of industrialization concerns the evolutionary dynamics implemented through the impetus of introduction
of the artefact. Yet the main result of this research actually concerns the need to manage the said
dynamics at two levels.
The first level concerns adaptation of the artefact to the singular. The innovation is based on theoretical
knowledge, built on the basis of hypothetical and deductive approaches which come under the expertise
of engineers and can be very generalized. Yet, in our Situation, the operators could be described äs the
experts of a singular process, that in which they worked for several years: they have very situated
knowledge, marked by the socio-technical system of a given Company. Introduction of the DPE brings
face to face very generalizable scientific concepts - which may have little to do with the site - and the
control strategies used which make the operators experts in their work Situation. But this is an expertise
which concerns the most frequent conditions of control. Industrialization consists of putting this
heterogeneous knowledge in tune. This process of exchange generates creation which is liable to be
translated at the level of the artefact. In our Situation, it is the said dynamics which led to an in-depth
change in the criteria and principles of the display of values provided to operators by the artefact. But we
consider that, in other situations, other adjustments could be desirable.
The second level more generally concerns risk management We know that some industrial accidents are
due to system defects in their technical and organization dimensions. These are the defects which
(Reason, J. 1990) suggested calling "Latent errors". Nevertheless, they can only be expressed in classes
of Situation that are very specific when the activity of the operators is found to be lacking, which is very
rare. The main question then does not so much concern the imputation of responsibility (which is the
question at the origin of the "latent error") äs the ways and means of identifying the "latent risks".
Certainly, the DPE is a system which can warn operators of an imminent chemical runaway. But, during
the study, it also appeared to be a system which, in the case of a certain type of accident (chemical
runaway), provides the opportunity to requestion the socio-technical system äs regards unknown classes
of Situation. In this sense, it could be used äs a means ofrevealing latent risks in a given Situation.
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